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DEFUSING THE BOMB: THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL
EXPLOSIVES STATUTE
Peter Moreno
Abstract: A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000), imposes a mandatory ten-year
term of imprisonment on anyone who "carries an explosive during the commission of any
felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States." The United States Courts of
Appeals are split over whether the statute must be read to include a relational element such
that the crime is carrying explosives in relation to another felony. The Third, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits have rejected the notion that the statute contains such an implicit limitation. In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit recently held that the application of § 844(h)(2) requires a specific
relationship between the explosives and the underlying felony and reversed a conviction
where explosives did not "facilitate" the felony. This Comment argues that application of the
statute should not be limited to cases in which the explosives facilitate the underlying felony
for four reasons: (I) the United States Supreme Court has adopted a broad reading of the
terms "carry" and "use" ir 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000)--the analogous firearm statutesuggesting that these terms in § 844(h) should also be read expansively; (2) Congress
amended § 924(c) to include an explicit relational element but did not amend § 844(h)(2) in
the same fashion, suggesting an intentional omission; (3) the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the explicit relational element in § 924(c) is inapplicable to § 844(h)(2) because unlike
firearms, explosives are not often carried to facilitate crimes; and (4) the courts may exercise
their equitable powers to preclude prosecution under § 844(h)(2) when doing so would
produce absurd results.

INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 1999, al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam smuggled
explosives into the United States in an attempt to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport.' United States Customs agents apprehended him in
Port Angeles, Washington, and Ressam was subsequently convicted on
several counts, including a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000).2
Section 844(h)(2) imposes a mandatory ten-year prison term on one who
"carries an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States." 3 On January 16, 2007, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Ressam's
conviction under § 844(h)(2) on the ground that his possession of the
1. United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 598, 600 (9th Cir. 2007), reh 'g denied, 491 F.3d 997
(9th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 600-01.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000). Section 844(h)(1) provides the same penalty for one who "uses
fire or an explosive" during the commission of a federal felony. Id. at § 844(h)(1).
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explosives was not related to the underlying felony of making a false
customs declaration. 4 The statute does not explicitly require a relational
element,5 and courts in other circuits have refused to infer this
requirement from the text. 6 Had Ressam been convicted in Detroit or
Philadelphia, for example, his conviction would most likely have been
affirmed. 7
Congress modeled § 844(h) after 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1970), a statute
that imposed similar penalties for firearm use and possession during the
commission of a felony.8 The original versions of the two statutes were
virtually identical. 9 Congress amended § 924(c) in 1984 to require
explicitly that a firearm be used or carried during "and in relation to" an
underlying felony.'0 However, Congress did not similarly amend
§ 844(h)(2), and the courts are now split over whether the "in relation
to" language is implicit in that statute.'
Interpretations of the pre-1984 version of § 924(c) have guided the
courts' interpretations of § 844(h)(2). In United States v. Stewart,'2 the
Ninth Circuit held that the pre-1984 version of § 924(c) contained an
implicit relational element, and that the explicit addition of the relational
element in 1984 was simply a reiteration of original intent.13 The Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Ressam14 noted the similarities between
§ 844(h)(2) and the pre-1984 version of § 924(c), and concluded that it
was bound by Stewart to find an implicit relational element in

4. Ressam, 474 F.3d at 604.

5. This Comment uses the term "relational element" in the context of § 844(h)(2) to refer to the
relationship that some courts require between the act of carrying explosives and the underlying
felony. Id. at 603; United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1177 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1178-79.
7. See United States v. Jenkins, 229 F. App'x 362, 365-67 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding conviction
where underlying felony was interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle); Rosenberg, 806
F.2d at 1177-79 (upholding conviction where the underlying felony was illegal possession of

firearms discovered in a storage facility with the explosives).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 69 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046
(describing the relationship between the two statutes); Ressam, 474 F.3d at 602.
9. See Ressam, 474 F.3d at 602-03 (noting the original language of the statutes and subsequent

amendments).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1985).
11. See, e.g., Ressam, 474 F.3d at 604; Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1178-79.
12. 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985).

13. Id. at 539-40.
14. 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007).
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§ 844(h)(2) as well. 15 In reaching its conclusion, the Ressam court
employed the doctrine of in pari materia, a canon of statutory
construction providing that similar statutes should be interpreted
similarly.' 6 The Ressam court held that the relational element was
satisfied7 only if the explosives aided the commission of the underlying
felony.'
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's approach in Ressam, the Third and
Sixth Circuits have declined to apply Stewart when interpreting
§ 844(h)(2). 18 In addition, these circuits have held that the text and
history of § 844(h)(2) do not warrant the inference of an implicit
relational element.' 9 The Fifth Circuit has taken the middle ground in
this debate, rejecting the relational element but paradoxically holding
that "[i]f the weapon was available to facilitate the crime or if it
'emboldened' a defendant in his offense, the jury could conclude the
defendant 'carried' the weapon during the offense. 2 °
This Comment argues that courts should not read an implicit
relational element into § 844(h)(2), but should rely instead on their
equitable powers to prevent prosecutions where the explosives and
underlying felony are totally unrelated. The Supreme Court's broad
reading of the terms "use" and "carry" in § 924(c) should prompt a
broad reading of the term "carry" in § 844(h)(2). 2 1 In addition, the
Ressam court's use of in pari materia was erroneous because it did not
address the Supreme Court's interpretations of § 924(c) or the divergent
amendments to § 924(c) and § 844(h).22 Part I of this Comment explains
the doctrine of in pari materia and its limitations. Part II compares
§ 844(h) and § 924(c), focusing on the terms "use" and "carry" in both
statutes, as well as the phrase "in relation to" in the current version of

15. Id. at 602-04.
16. Id. The English translation of in pari materia is "in the same matter." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004). For a discussion of in pari materia generally, see Linquist v.
Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 1987).
17. Ressam, 474 F.3d at 604.
18. United States v. Jenkins, 229 F. App'x 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rosenberg,
806 F.2d 1169, 1178-79 (3d Cir. 1986).
19. Jenkins, 229 F. App'x at 367; Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1178-79.
20. United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding conviction where
underlying felony was kidnapping and explosives were used to embolden the defendant).
21. See infra Part IV.A.

22. See Ressam, 474 F.3d at 602-03.
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§ 924(c)(1)(A). Part III contrasts the courts' interpretation of "carry" in
§ 844(h)(2) with the Supreme Court's interpretation of "use" and "carry"
in § 924(c). Part IV argues that courts should refrain from reading a
relational element into § 844(h) for four reasons: (1) the Supreme Court
has interpreted § 924(c) expansively, suggesting § 844(h) should also be
read expansively, in accordance with in pari materia; (2) Congress
amended § 924(c) to include an explicit relational element but did not
amend § 844(h) in the same fashion, suggesting an intentional omission;
(3) the Supreme Court's interpretation of the explicit relational element
in § 924(c)-the facilitation standard, is inapplicable to § 844(h) because
criminals do not typically carry explosives to facilitate other crimes; and
(4) the courts may exercise their equitable powers to preclude
prosecution under § 844(h)(2) when doing so would produce absurd
results, such as when the underlying felony is totally unrelated to the
carrying of explosives.
I.

INPARIMATERIA REQUIRES COURTS TO INTERPRET
IDENTICAL LANGUAGE IN SIMILAR STATUTES
SIMILARLY

Statutes that share a common purpose or legislative history often bear
strong similarities in spirit and content.2 3 Courts interpreting ambiguous
terms in a statute will sometimes seek guidance from case law that
discusses similar terminology in analogous statutes. 24 This approach,
called the doctrine of in pari materia, recognizes that legislatures
generally intend to create a harmonious body of law.25 Where two
statutes differ, however, and provisions of each can be read
independently without disrupting the harmony of the two, the doctrine of
26
in pari materiahas limited applicability.

23. See, e.g., Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Sch., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per

curiam) (noting similarities in wording between § 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1617, 86 Stat. 369, and § 204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a3(b), 78 Stat. 244, and finding that the two statutes had a "common raison d'etre") (quoting Johnson
v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1972)).
24. Id.
25. See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:03 (6th ed.

2006).
26. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984).
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A.

Courts Use In Pari Materia When Statutes Share a Similar Purpose
and Similar Language

The doctrine of in pari materia provides that where statutes relate to
the same class of persons or things, or where they have the same
purpose, they should be interpreted similarly unless legislative history or
purpose suggests material differences.2 7 The Supreme Court emphasized
in Erlenbaughv. United States: 28
The rule of in pari materia ... is a reflection of practical
experience in the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body
generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a
given context. Thus, for example, a "later act can... be
regarded as a legislative interpretation of [an] earlier act ... in
the sense that it aids in ascertaining the meaning of the words as
used in their contemporary setting," and "is therefore entitled to
great weight in resolving any ambiguities and doubts. 2 9
Courts typically apply in pari materia to a statute only when the text
is ambiguous or its significance is doubtful.3 0 Statutes that share the
same general legislative scheme or plan, or are aimed at the
accomplishment of similar results are considered in pari materia.31 The
Supreme Court held in Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis
City Schools 32 that similar language regarding recovery of attorney's
fees in lawsuits under the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be read together, in part because both
acts were designed to compensate individuals injured by racial
discrimination. 33 The doctrine has been extended to the criminal context,

27. See Ressam, 474 F.3d at 602; Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 1987) ("A
primary rule of statutory construction is that when a court interprets multiple statutes dealing with a

related subject or object, the statutes are in pari materia and must be considered together.");
SINGER, supra note 25, at § 51:03 (discussing the general rule); cf Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510
U.S. 517, 523-25 (1994) (holding that similar language could not be interpreted similarly when the
goals of the statutes were different).
28. 409 U.S. 239 (1972).

29. Id. at 243-44 (quoting United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1940)).
30. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. S. Const. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1967) (declining to

apply the doctrine when statutory language was clear).
31. See generally Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Sch., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per

curiam) (noting that two statutes should be read in a complementary fashion when they share the
same language and a similar purpose, though not mentioning in pari materia specifically).
32. 412 U.S. 427 (1973).

33. Id. at 428.
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where courts have construed identical terms in analogous statutes
identically. 34 For example, the Supreme Court stated that the term
"property" in a mail fraud statute should be read in parimateria with the
same term in a wire fraud statute.35
B.

Where Statutes Are Dissimilar,In Pari Materia Has Limited
Applicability

Courts apply in pari materia only when the statutes are similar.36
Where similar statutes differ and are capable of coexistence, each should
be regarded as independently effective.37 The Supreme Court in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.38 indicated that even when the purposes of
two differently worded statutes are intertwined, courts should be
reluctant to find that the language of one statute supersedes the other.39
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in General Electric Co. v. Southern
Construction Co. 40 reasoned that where a legislature has inserted a
provision in only one of two statutes that deal with closely related
subject matter, it is reasonable to infer that the failure to include that
provision in the other statute was deliberate rather than inadvertent.41
Additionally, the application of in pari materia may be inappropriate
where one statute contains language that limits its scope and a similar
statute does not contain such limiting language.4 2 For example, in
34. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355-57 (2005) (using the Court's previous
interpretation of the term "property" in a mail fraud statute to guide its interpretation of the same
term in a wire fraud statute); United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2007) (reasoning
that a statute penalizing the use of explosives should be read in pari materia with the firearm statute
after which the explosives statute was modeled).
35. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 355 n.2 (referencing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 26
(2000)).
36. See SINGER, supra note 25, at § 51:03.
37. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984) (choosing an interpretation that
gives force to both statutes in question); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("[W]hen
two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.").
38. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
39. Id. at 1018.
40. 383 F.2d 135 (SthCir. 1967).
41. id. at 138 n.4.; see also People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal. 1946) (stating the rule); 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 352 (2007) (noting that where a statute contains a given provision, the omission of
that provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject demonstrates a different intention
existed).
U.S. _, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411-13 (2006)
42. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
(reasoning that language in an anti-discrimination statute that limits its scope to employer actions
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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,43 the Supreme
Court held that words limiting the scope of a Title VII employment
discrimination statute should not be read into a different section of Title
VII dealing with anti-retaliation. 4 The Court noted, "[w]e normally
presume that, where words differ as they differ here, 'Congress acts
'' 4
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. , 5
Because courts generally prefer to derive meaning from the text of the
specific statute at issue, rather than from comparisons to analogous

statutes, textual differences between statutes are likely to affect
interpretation of each individual statute.46
The fact that statutes contain some differences, however, does not
mean courts cannot construe common elements of statutes similarly.
Where in pari materia is not applicable to all parts of two statutes, courts
may still compare common elements to aid interpretation. 47 Courts can
still use in pari materia to compare amended statutes with statutes that

remain unchanged. 48 There are no firm rules regarding the applicability
of in pari materia.49 Norman Singer, an eminent scholar of statutory
interpretation, stated the guiding principle as a pragmatic test: "[I]f it is
natural and reasonable to think that the understanding of members of the
legislature or persons to be affected by a statute, be influenced by

affecting employment or the workplace should not be read into an anti-retaliation statute because
the words are absent from the latter statute and the purposes of the statutes are different); Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (noting differences in language are particularly important
when comparing sections within the same act).
43. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
44. Id. at 2411-13.
45. Id. at 2412 (quoting Russello, 464 U.S. at 23).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997) (reasoning that the starting
point for determining legislative intent is the language and structure of the statute itself).
47. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Dep't of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 105
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that differences between labor statutes should not preclude their
comparison for purposes of interpretation); see also Overstreet v. N. Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125,
131-32 (1943) (holding that the phrase "engaged in commerce" in two labor statutes should be read
similarly, even though the statutes were not strictly analogous).
48. See, e.g., In re Seiscom Delta, Inc., 857 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that an
amendment to a bankruptcy statute was in fact confirmation that the drafters of the statute had
always intended it to be read in pari materia with a rule of civil procedure); cf SINGER, supra note
25, at § 51.03 (noting that caution should be used in holding statutes in pari materia where an
amendment is involved).
49. SINGER, supra note 25, at § 51:03.
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another statute, then a court called upon to construe the act in5 0 question
should also allow its understanding to be similarly influenced.
Courts Must Apply In Pari Materia in Light of Other Canons of
Statutory Construction,Including the Rule that Statutes Should Be
Construed to Avoid Absurd Results

C.

It is a well-established rule that a court must construe statutes to avoid
unreasonable or absurd results, 51 and that if possible, unclear provisions

should be given a reasonable and intelligent construction.52 Where there
are two reasonable interpretations of a statute, and one yields absurd
results while the other does not, the latter interpretation is favored. 3
United States v. Brown54 generally defined absurd results as those that
nullify Congressional intent.55 Specifically, the Brown Court rejected as
absurd a reading of the Federal Escape Act 56 that would restrict a judge
from imposing additional prison sentences for prison escapes, "the one
type of offense which Congress unmistakably intended to be subject to
separate and added punishment ....

,

However, courts should be

cautious in employing the absurd results doctrine 58 because it entails the
risk that the judiciary will displace legislative policy on the basis of
speculation that the legislature could not have meant what it said. 9
In sum, courts employ in pari materia primarily to create a
harmonious body of law. Where statutes can be read independently,
without contradicting prior interpretations of one another, in pari
materia is less useful. Although differences between statutes do not
necessarily preclude the application of in pari materia, courts should

50. Id.

51. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) ("No rule of construction necessitates our
acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.").
52. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:12 (6th ed. 2006).

53. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 414-15 (1970) (rejecting a statutory reading that
would render legislative purpose futile).
54. 333 U.S. 18 (1948).

55. Id. at 26.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 753(h) (1935).
57. Brown, 333 U.S. at 27.
58. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:7 (6th ed. 2006).

U.S. -_,126 S.Ct. 2455, 2459
59. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, (2006) (noting the general rule that courts must presume that legislatures mean what they say in
statutes); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (holding that
where there is a plausible explanation for an omission from a statute, the omission is not absurd).
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apply the doctrine with caution in such circumstances to assure that the
intent of the legislature is respected and absurd results are avoided.
II.

SECTIONS 844(h) AND 924(c) CONTAIN IDENTICAL TERMS
AND WERE INTENDED TO FULFILL SIMILAR PURPOSES

The federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) imposes a ten-year mandatory
prison term on anyone convicted of using or carrying explosives during
the commission of a federal felony.6 ° Congress modeled § 844(h) after
§ 924(c), a pre-existing statute that imposed similar penalties on persons
who use or carry firearms during the commission of a federal felony. 6'
The original versions of the statutes were virtually identical, and they
still share some identical language, including the terms "use" and
"carry. '62 In their current, amended form, the two statutes contain
meaningful differences as well.63
A.

Section 844(h) Imposes a Ten-Year Prison Sentence on Anyone
Who Uses or Carriesan Explosive During the Commission of a
FederalFelony

The federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) adds ten years to the prison
sentence of anyone convicted of using or carrying explosives during the
commission of a federal felony. 64 Congress originally enacted § 844(h)
in 197065 and subsequently amended it multiple times to strengthen
penalties.6 6 Congress last amended this statute in 1996.67
The focus of this Comment is the definition of the word "carries," the
first word in § 844(h)(2). The current text of § 844(h) reads in part:
(h) Whoever(1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony which may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, or

60.
61.
62.
63.

18 U.S.C. § 844(h) (2000).
H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 69 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,4046.
See infra Part I.C.
Id.

64. 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) (2000).
65. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1102(a), 84 Stat. 922, 956 (1970).
66. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 708(a)(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1296 (1996);
§ 6474(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4379-80 (1988).

Pub. L. No. 100-690,

67. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 708(a)(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1296 (1996).
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(2) carries an explosive during the commission of any felony
which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
including a felony which provides for an enhanced punishment
if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
felony, be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years.68
This statute was drafted primarily to deter bombings, 69 and Congress has
not indicated any change in the purpose of the statute.7 °
B.

CongressPassedSection 844(h) to PreventBombings Generally

The legislative history of § 844(h), although sparse, indicates that
Congress passed the original statute in 1970 to combat the rash of
bombings related to social and political protests in the late 1960s.7 1
United States Representatives advocating for passage repeatedly
emphasized the goal of curbing politically-related bombings.7
Nonetheless, there are very few statements or documents relating to the
original bill, and it remains unclear whether the statute was designed to
have other effects.
C.

Congress Modeled Section 844(h) After Section 924(c), and the
Statutes Retain Several Key Similarities

Congress drew much of the spirit and language for § 844(h) from the
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a pre-existing statute that
imposed similar prison sentences on persons who use or carry firearms
during the commission of a federal felony.7 3 Section § 844(h) was
enacted in 1970,74 two years after the enactment of § 924(c).7 5 The U.S.
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Report on the bill stated
that "[s]ection 844(h) carries over to the explosives area the stringent
68. 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000).
69. United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1983); H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 37 (1970),
as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4013 ("Bombings and the threat of bombings have
become an ugly, recurrent incident of life in cities and on campuses throughout our Nation.").
70. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 708(a)(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1296 (1996); Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 6474(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4379-80 (1988).
71. See Gelb, 700 F.2d at 878 (citing legislative history).
72. Id.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 69 (1970), as reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046.
74. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1102(a), 84 Stat. 922, 956 (1970).
75. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 233 (1968).
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provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 [now § 924(c)] relating to the
use of firearms and the unlawful carrying' 76of firearms to commit, or
during the commission of a Federal felony."
Congress used nearly identical language in drafting the original
versions of § 924(c) and § 844(h).77 The only textual difference between
the original versions of these two statutes was that § 924(c) contained
the word "firearm" whereas § 844(h) contained the word "explosive. 7 8
The original version of § 924(c) provided: "Whoever-(1) uses afirearm
to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, or (2) carries afirearm unlawfully during the commission of any
felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States ...
(emphasis added).79
Similarly, the original version of § 844(h) provided: "Whoever-(1)
uses an explosive to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, or (2) carries an explosive unlawfully during
the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States. . . ." (emphasis added). 80 The original versions of
§ 924(c) and § 844(h) were substantially identical in language, and
Congress patterned § 844(h) directly after § 924(c). 8'
Despite the original parallels between the statutes, Congress has
separately amended both § 844(h) and § 924(c) so that portions of the
statutes are no longer identical.82 In 1984, Congress struck the word
"unlawfully" from § 924(c)(2), and replaced the word "during" with the
phrase "during and in relation to."' 83 In 1988, Congress similarly struck
the word "unlawfully" from § 844(h)(2).84 However, Congress did not
replace the word "during" in § 844(h) with the phrase "during and in
relation to," as it had done with § 924(c), thereby creating a notable
difference between the statutes.85 The legislative history of the 1988
76. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 69 (1970), as reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046.

77. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 233 (1968); Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1102(a), 84 Stat.
922, 956 (1970).
78. Id.
79. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 233 (1968).
80. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1102(a), 84 Stat. 922, 956 (1970).
81. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 69 (1970), as reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046.
82. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 708(a)(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1296 (1996); Pub. L. No. 100-690,

§ 6474(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4379-80 (1988).
83. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138 (1984).
84. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6474(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4379-80 (1988).
85. Id.

1017

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:1007, 2007

amendment fails to explain whether the difference was intentional.86 The
Senate Report simply indicated that the amendment strengthened the
penalty provisions of § 844(h) for "using or carrying an explosive during
the commission of a federal felony, so as to bring it in line with similar
amendments adopted in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984.
, 7
As a result of the amendments, the current versions of § 844(h) and
§ 924(c) are similar in part, and dissimilar in part. 88 Section 924(c),
reflecting its several amendments, currently provides, in relevant part:
...any person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime.., for which the person may
be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime-(i) be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years .... 89
In sum, § 844(h) and § 924(c) share a common legislative pedigree,
and the history of the two statutes indicates they were passed for the
common purpose of discouraging criminals from carrying dangerous
weapons. Both statutes still use the key terms "use" and "carry."
However, the firearm statute, unlike the explosives statute, was amended
in 1984 to require the government to prove a defendant has carried a
firearm in relation to an underlying felony. Congress did not similarly
amend § 844(h), although Congress has amended § 844(h) in other ways
since 1984.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 924(c) SUGGESTS SECTION 844(h)(2) SHOULD BE
READ BROADLY
The United States Courts of Appeals have split over whether
prosecution under § 844(h)(2) implicitly requires that a defendant carry
an explosive in relation to the commission of an underlying felony. 90
The courts have made frequent references to § 924(c) in determining

86. 134 CONG. REc. S17,360-62, 17,367 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988).
87. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000); id. § 924(c).
89. Id. § 924(c).
90. See infra Part III.A.
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whether an implicit relational element exists in § 844(h)(2), exploring in
particular the common legislative histories of the statutes. 9 1 Curiously,
the courts, when interpreting the term "carry" in § 844(h)(2), have not
turned to Supreme Court decisions regarding § 924(c) for guidance.92
A.

The UnitedStates Courts of Appeals Have Split Regardingthe
Interpretationof the Phrase "Carriesan Explosive During the
Commission ofAny Felony" in Section 844(h)(2)

The United States Courts of Appeals have disagreed over whether the
government needs to show that a defendant carried an explosive in
relation to an underlying felony to obtain a conviction under
§ 844(h)(2). 93 The two main competing theories are represented by
United States v. Rosenberg,94 which held that the statute did not demand
such a relationship,9 5 and Ressam, which held that such a relationship
was required.9 6 Ressam suggested that the phrase "carries an explosive
during the commission of any felony" should be read to mean "carries an
explosive during and in relation to the commission of any felony, 9 7
whereas Rosenberg held that reading "in relation to" into the statute was
inappropriate.98 United States v. Ivy99 represents the middle ground,
holding that § 844(h)(2) does not contain an implicit relational element,
but the term "carry" itself implies that the explosive must bear a certain
relationship to the underlying felony.' 00
The Ninth Circuit in Ressam concluded that § 844(h)(2) required the
government to prove that the defendant carried explosives in relation to
the underlying felony, and the court held that such a relationship existed
only when the explosives facilitated the crime. 10 Applying the doctrine
of in pari materia, the Ressam court relied heavily on its interpretation

91.
92.
93.
F.2d

Id.
See infra Part III.C.
See United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ivy, 929
147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1177-79 (3d Cir. 1986).

94. 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 1179.

96. Ressam, 474 F.3d at 603-04.
97. See id.
98. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1177-79.
99. 929 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
100. Id. at 151.
101. Ressam, 474 F.3d at 603-04.
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of the pre-1984 § 924(c)(2) in United States v. Stewart.10 2 In Stewart, the
Ninth Circuit analyzed the analogous phrase in the firearm statute before
it was amended to include the "in relation to" language. 0 3 Stewart held
that one could be convicted for carrying a firearm under § 924(c) only if
"the firearm facilitated or had a role in the crime, such as emboldening
an actor who had the opportunity or ability to display or discharge the
weapon to protect himself or intimidate others, whether or not such
display or discharge in fact occurred ... ,,

In so holding, the Stewart

Court relied on an earlier case in which the Ninth Circuit had applied the
"facilitation standard" in the context of § 924(c)(1)1 0 5 In that case,
United States v. Moore,10 6 the Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant
used his gun to rob a bank much in the same way he used his gloves and
ski mask: "[t]hese items increased the likelihood of success; without
them he probably would not have sallied forth."' °7 The Ressam court
inferred an identical facilitation requirement in § 844(h)(2) and reversed
a conviction where this particular relationship between the carrying of
the explosive and the underlying felony was not found. 0 8 The Ninth
Circuit stated, "[i]t is not enough for the government to prove that
Ressam lied because he was smuggling explosives in the trunk of his
car." 0 9 The Ninth Circuit required that the explosives themselves aid the
commission of the crime." 0
In contrast, the Third Circuit in Rosenberg and the Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Jenkins'" declined to require the government to show
that the defendant carried explosives in relation to the underlying
felony. 12 In Rosenberg, two defendants appealed multiple convictions
for stockpiling firearms, explosives, and false identification documents
in a storage facility; their intent in stockpiling these items was

102. Id. at 602-04 (relying on United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1985)).
103. Stewart, 779 F.2d at 539-40.
104. Id. at 540.

105. Id.
106. 580 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1978).
107. Id.
at 362.
108. Ressam, 474 F.3d at 604.
109. Id.
110. See id.

1I1.229 F. App'x 362 (6th Cir. 2005).
112. Jenkins, 229 F. App'x at 367; United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1177-79 (3d Cir.
1986).
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unknown." 3 The court in Rosenberg explicitly rejected the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history of § 924(c) in
Stewart. 1 4 The court noted that there was no indication § 924(c) ever
contained an implicit relational element, and that the decision to attach
an explicit relational element to § 924(c) but not to § 844(h) was open to
multiple interpretations."15 Finding the legislative histories of § 924(c)
and § 844(h) inconclusive, Rosenberg reverted to the plain language of
the statute, upholding a conviction where the underlying felony involved
illegal possession of firearms." 6 Similarly, Jenkins adopted the
Rosenberg rationale to uphold a conviction where the underlying felony
was interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. 1 7 In Jenkins, the
defendant had stolen explosives with the intent to bomb multiple
government buildings. 118
Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Ivy seemed to share elements of both the
Third and Ninth Circuits' interpretations. In Ivy, a defendant was
convicted of carrying a pipe bomb in his car while he kidnapped his
estranged wife." 9 Ivy held that § 844(h)(2) did not specifically require
that explosives be carried in relation to another crime.' 20 Despite
rejecting the relational requirement, the Court noted that if the pipe
bomb was available to facilitate the kidnapping, or if it emboldened the
defendant in his offense, a jury could find that the defendant "carried"
the explosive under § 844(h)(2).' 2 ' It is unclear if the Fifth Circuit would
in Ivy had the government not met the
have upheld the conviction
122
standard.
facilitation
B.

The Debate Between the CircuitsHas Exposed the Extent to Which
the Word "Carry" Differs from "Possess"

The circuit split regarding the existence of an implicit relational
element in § 844(h)(2) is a manifestation of a more fundamental
113. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1172.

114. Id. at 1178.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1178-79.
117. Jenkins, 229 F. App'x at 367.
118. Id. at 363-64.

119. United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991).
120. Id. (citing Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1177)
121. Id. (citing United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985)).
122. See id.
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question: to what extent does "carrying" differ from coincidental
possession?. 23 Whether the word "carry" is distinct from the word
"possess" is important because equating the two terms greatly expands
the applicability of § 844(h)(2).124 No circuit has addressed this issue
explicitly, but the opinions suggest that this question is implicit in the
courts' analysis of § 844(h)(2). 125 Ressam in particular included a
detailed discussion of the analogous firearm statute, § 924(c), and noted
that "in relation to" was added to that statute to prevent the government
from prosecuting individuals who1 26
merely possess a firearm during the
commission of an unrelated crime.
Adhering to the plain language of the statute, the Third Circuit in
Rosenberg did not appear to draw any distinction between the words
"carry" and "possess" and upheld a conviction where there was little
more than a coincidental relationship between the explosives and the
underlying offense.1 27 The Fifth Circuit in Ivy appeared to struggle with
this style of construction.1 28 On one hand, Ivy found that § 844(h)(2) did
not include a relational element. 129 On the other hand, Ivy held that a
defendant could be found to "carry" the explosives if the explosives
facilitated the underlying crime, suggesting that "carry" connotes
something beyond possession.' 30 Ivy did not address whether the
conviction would have stood had there been no facilitation. Like Ivy,
Ressam seemed to reject the idea that "carry" equals "possess," but
contrary to Ivy, Ressam read a relational element into § 844(h)(2) to
distinguish the two terms. 131
Section 844(h)(2) lacks the explicit "in relation to" language found in
§ 924(c), and there seems to be little in the language of § 844(h) that
distinguishes "carry" from "possess."' 132 The Rosenberg court's apparent
finding that "carry" equals "possess" is supported by the general canon
123. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1176-77 (discussing "carrying" and "possession" charges
in the same section and failing to distinguish between the two).
124. Compare id. at 176-79, with United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 2007).
125. See Ressam, 474 F.3d at 602; Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1176-77.
126. Ressam, 474 F.3d at 602.
127. See Rosenberg, 806 F.2d. at 1179.
128. United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991).
129. Id. (noting that conviction under the statute did not require a finding that the defendant
carried the explosives "during and in relation to" the kidnapping).
130. Id.
131. See Ressam, 474 F.3d at 604.
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000).
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that the plain text of a statute controls where the language is clear. 133 On
the other hand, the courts that distinguish "carry" from "possess" are
generally supported by United States v. Bailey,1 34 which noted the
135
difference between the two words in an analysis of the firearm statute,
and by courts holding that
statutory context is important in determining
136
the meaning of a word.

C.

Although the Supreme Court Has Interpretedthe Terms "Uses"
and "Carries" Within Section 924(c), No United States Courtof
Appeals Has Discussed These Supreme CourtInterpretations
While Analyzing Section 844(h) (2)

The Supreme Court has never analyzed § 844(h)(2), but has
interpreted the term "uses" in § 924(c) broadly to include nonviolent use
of a firearm.1 37 The Courts of Appeals can acknowledge such
interpretations when applying § 844(h)(2) because it is well settled that a
Court of Appeals can depart from circuit precedent based on an
intervening opinion of the Supreme Court that undermines the prior
precedent. 138 In Smith v. United States,139 a defendant was convicted of
bartering guns for narcotics under § 924(c), and the Court upheld the
conviction on the ground that bartering constituted use. 140 Smith relied
on the BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY definition of the term "use": "[t]o
make use of, to convert to one's service; to employ; to avail oneself of;
to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action by means of."' 14 ' Smith

rejected the argument that "uses" means "uses as a weapon," holding
that "[i]mposing a more restrictive reading of the phrase 'uses ... a
firearm' does violence not only to the structure and language of the
133. See, e.g., United States v, Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984) (holding plain language

controls unless it leads to results that are "absurd or glaringly unjust").
134. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).

135. Id. at 144-45.
136. See, e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (holding that the meaning
language, plain or not, depends on context); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129,
("'[T]he meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from
in which it is used."').
137. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1993).
138. Nelson v. Shuffman, 476 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 2007) (Colloton, J., dissenting)

of statutory
132 (1993)
the context

(stating the

rule).

139. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
140. Id. at 229.
141. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)).
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statute, but to its purpose as well.' ' 142 Smith noted that there was no
indication Congress intended for courts to draw a distinction between
use of a gun as a weapon and as an item of barter because "[the gun]
' 43
creates a grave possibility of violence and death in either capacity."'
The Supreme Court sharpened the definition of "use" in Bailey,
equating "use" with active employment, and holding that storage of a
gun in the defendant's car did not constitute "use" in the context of
§ 924(c). 144 Bailey did not overrule Smith but simply clarified that "use"
145
must be active, at least in part to distinguish "use" from "carry."'
The Supreme Court in Muscarello v. United States 146 did not assign a
formal definition to the term "carries" in § 924(c), but held that "carry"
must be read more broadly than "use," and can include instances where a
defendant possesses a firearm in his immediate vicinity but does not
actively employ it.' 47 Thus, Muscarello provided that "use"

and

"carrying" are distinct concepts within § 924(c).148 Firearms can be used
without being carried, such as when an offender trades a firearm for
something without handling it. 149 Likewise, a firearm can be carried

without being used, such as when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his
0
clothing throughout a drug transaction.15
Despite the Supreme Court's broad reading of "carry" in Muscarello,
51
the Court has stopped short of equating "carry" with mere possession.
Bailey stated that if Congress had intended to equate "use" with
"possession," it could have simply used the word "possession."' 52 This
reasoning from Bailey suggests that the Court would also distinguish

142. Id. at 240.
143. Id.
144. United States v. Bailey, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995).

145. See id. at 145-46.
146. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
147. Id. at 136-37 (declining to limit the statute to instances where the firearms were immediately
accessible and upholding conviction of drug traffickers who carried guns in a locked glove
compartment and in a trunk).
148. Id. at 145-46.
149. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993).
150. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146; see also Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 136-37.
151. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (quoting United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 467 (1st Cir.
1994) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he ordinary meanings of the words 'use' and
'carry' ... connote activity beyond simple possession.")).
152. Id. at 148.
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"carry" from "possession."' 153 Muscarello explained that the explicit
relational element in § 924(c) served to distinguish "carry" from
"possess," and that the relational element prevented criminalization of
54
gun possession wholly unrelated to the underlying offense.1
The Muscarello Court noted that one justification for its broad
reading of the term "carry" is that the term is limited within § 924(c) by
the phrase "inrelation to.' 55 The Court stated, "[o]nce one takes
account of the words 'during' and 'in relation to' it no longer seems
beyond Congress' likely intent, or otherwise unfair, to interpret the
statute as we have done."' 156 This language suggests that the Court may
not have read "carry" so broadly had this limiting language not been
included in the statute. 5 7 The Court made this point again in Smith,
where the court justified its broad reading of the term "use" by noting
that the "in relation to" language serves to contain the scope of the
statute, thereby preventing absurd prosecutions, such as where a
defendant "'uses' a firearm to scratch his head ....
,1'8
D.

The Supreme Court Has Held that the "In Relation To "Element in
Section 924(c) Is Satisfied When the Firearm Is Used to Facilitate
the Underlying Offense

The Supreme Court has defined the meaning and purpose of "in
relation to" in the context of § 924(c), holding the element is satisfied if
the firearm facilitated the underlying felony. 159 Muscarello noted that by
adding "in relation to" to § 924(c), Congress intended to avoid
prosecutions where possession was totally unrelated to the underlying
felony. 160 Smith held that "in relation to" means, at a minimum, that the
firearm have some purpose or effect regarding the underlying felony,

153. Id.

154. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 137 (1998).
155. Id.
156. Id. (declining to limit the statute's applicability to instances where the firearms were
immediately accessible).
157. Id.
158. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 232 (1993).
159. See, e.g., id. at 238 (holding that the relational element was satisfied when the underlying
felony was drug trafficking).
160. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 137; see also United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir.
1985) (observing that "in relation to" was "added to allay explicitly the concern that a person could
be prosecuted ...for committing an entirely unrelated crime while in possession of a firearm").
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and that its presence cannot be the result of coincidence or accident.16 ,
Applying the language of the statute to the facts in Smith, the Court held
that "in relation to" meant the gun must at least "facilitat[e], or ha[ve]
the potential of facilitating" the 1drug
trafficking offense, adopting the
62
facilitation standard from Stewart.
Ressam, which found "in relation to" implicit in § 844(h)(2), held that
this language is satisfied only when the explosives facilitate the
underlying felony.163 Specifically, Ressam overturned a conviction
where the explosives did not facilitate the underlying felony.' 64 In this
sense, the holding in Ressam was doubly unusual: the Ninth Circuit
became the first Court of Appeals to read "in relation to" into
§ 844(h)(2), and the first to hold that the implicit relational element was
satisfied by the facilitation
standard, which was developed in firearm65
related case law.'
In sum, the United States Courts of Appeals have disagreed over
whether § 844(h)(2) applies to defendants who coincidentally possess
explosives during the commission of another federal felony. Multiple
courts have held that § 844(h)(2) is applicable to these defendants,
generally relying on a plain language reading of the statute. The Ressam
court has held that the statute does not apply to such defendants, citing
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 924(c) in Stewart to support a
similar interpretation of § 844(h)(2). None of the courts have referenced
Supreme Court decisions regarding § 924(c) to guide their reading of the
term "carry."
IV. COURTS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM READING A RIGID
RELATIONAL ELEMENT INTO SECTION 844(h)(2)
Courts should refrain from restricting the meaning of the term "carry"
in § 844(h)(2). 166 The Supreme Court has read the identical term broadly
in § 924(c).167 The fact that Congress amended § 924(c) to include an
explicit relational element but did not make the same amendment to
§ 844(h)(2) further supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend
161. Smith, 508 U.S. at 238.
162. Id. (quoting Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540).

163. United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2007).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See infra Part IV.A.
167. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1998).
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to include additional restrictive elements in § 844(h)(2). 168 A broad
reading of § 844(h)(2) satisfies public policy concerns and reflects the
varied ways in which criminals use explosives. 169 Furthermore, courts
may rely on equitable powers to prevent70 application of the statute when
doing so would produce absurd results.1
A.

In Accordance with the Doctrine of In Pari Materia, Lower Courts
Should Follow the Supreme Court'sBroadReading of "Carry" in
Muscarello When Interpreting the Same Term in Section 844(h)

The doctrine of in pari materia provides that courts should interpret
§ 844(h) and § 924(c) similarly because the statutes are similar in form
and share the common purpose of preventing the use of dangerous
weapons. 171 The legislative history of § 844(h) made reference to the
parallel aims of § 924(c),172 and the nearly identical language of the two
original statutes strongly suggests they were part of the same legislative
scheme. 173 Under Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City
Schools, 174 courts should read such statutes
in pari materiato the extent
175
the statutes share common language.
The Ninth Circuit used in pari materia in Ressam, holding that the
court's previous interpretation of the original § 924(c) should control its
interpretation of the current § 844(h), 176 but the court erred in limiting its
application of in pari materia to its own statutory interpretations. This
decision was erroneous in part because the Ninth Circuit ignored
numerous Supreme Court decisions construing similar terms in
§ 924(c), 177 most notably the Muscarello decision. 178 Although
Muscarello did not explicitly denounce the Ninth Circuit's restrictive
168. See infra Part W.B.
169. See infra Part IV.C.
170. See infra Part IV.D.

171. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 69 (1970), as reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046.
172. Id.
173. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 233 (1968); Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1102(a), 84
Stat. 922, 956 (1970).
174. 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
175. Id. at 428 (noting that statutes should be read together when they share the same language,
especially where they have a similar purpose).
176. See United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2007).
177. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1998); cf Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1993); United States v. Bailey, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995).
178. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 136-37.

1027

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:1007, 2007

reading of § 924(c) in Stewart, the court did hold that a broad reading of
that statute was appropriate, thereby undermining the Stewart
decision. 179 Like the other circuits interpreting § 844(h), the Ninth
Circuit failed to take notice of Muscarello and the other Supreme Court
cases interpreting analogous terms in § 924(c).
The common terms in § 844(h)(2) and § 924(c) should be read in pari
materia. The term "carries" appears in both current statutes, and
although the statutes now contain different language, the two statutes
have a common purpose and a common legislative genesis.1 80 Overstreet
v. North Shore Corp.,'8 1 while not citing the doctrine of in pari materia
specifically, supported parallel readings of a common phrase where two
statutes bore some substantive differences but fulfilled a similar
purpose. 82 Indeed, courts are inclined to apply in pari materia when
183
they find statutes share common legislative purposes and histories.
Sections 844(h)(2) and 924(c) share these features.
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the term "carry" under
§ 924(c) in Muscarello should be applied in pari materia to § 844(h)(2).
In Muscarello, the Court held that one may "carry" firearms even when
the firearms are not readily available as weapons. 184 The Muscarello
court generally declined to restrict the meaning of "carry."' 185 The
Court's decisions in Smith and Bailey confirm that a broad reading of
§ 924(c) is appropriate. 86 Smith held that "use" incorporates nonviolent
use of a weapon, and Bailey noted that the definition of "carry" must be
even broader.187 Given the similar aims of § 924(c) and § 844(h), it
follows that a broad reading of § 844(h)(2) is required. A relational
element could severely restrict application of § 844(h)(2), especially
considering that the Supreme Court has interpreted the relational
element in § 924(c) narrowly to require that the weapon be used to

179. Id. at 137-38 (1998) (holding that a narrow interpretation of "carry" was inappropriate).
180. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 69 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046
(describing the relationship between the two statutes); Ressam, 474 F.3d at 602.
181. 318 U.S. 125 (1943).
182. Id. at 131-32.
183. SINGER, supra note 25, at § 51:3.
184. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138.
185. Id. at 137-39.
186. United States v. Bailey, 516 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1995); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
240 (1993).
187. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145-46; Smith, 508 U.S. at 240.
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facilitate the underlying felony.188 Such an effect is directly contrary to
the expansive scope the Supreme Court has afforded § 924(c), and by
implication, § 844(h)(2). 8 9
Even if "carry" cannot be read identically in both § 844(h)(2) and
§ 924(c), the general spirit of interpretation in Muscarello should guide
the courts in interpreting § 844(h)(2).190 The Muscarello Court noted that
its broad reading of "carry" was justified at least in part by the "in
relation to" language included in the statute.' 9' The Smith Court also
noted the importance of the language as a bulwark against absurd
prosecutions. 192 Courts must consider these explanations when
determining the applicability of Muscarello to interpretations of
§ 844(h)(2), because the "in relation to" language is in fact absent from
§ 844(h)(2). Notwithstanding this potential problem, the fact remains
that Muscarello explicitly rejected other limitations on the term "carry,"
including the suggestion that the scope of the term be limited to
instances where a gun is immediately accessible. 93 Thus, the general
spirit of Muscarello demands a broad reading of the term "carry" and
should discourage courts from confining the meaning of "carry" in
§ 844(h)(2) with restrictive elements that are absent from the statutory
language.
B.

Congress Amended Section 924(c) to Include an Explicit
Relational Element but Did Not So Modify Section 844(h)(2),
Suggesting that It Did Not Intend to Restrict Application of
Section 844(h) in a SimilarManner

In light of the divergent amendments to § 844(h) and § 924(c), courts
should apply the doctrine of in parimateria only to identical terms in the
two statutes, and should read the dissimilar language in the statutes
independently. The general purpose of in pari materia is to allow
harmonious interpretation of an entire body of law. 194 For example,
Overstreetheld that statutes with some differences may be read similarly
where language is comparable and a common legislative purpose is
188. Smith, 508 U.S. at 238.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra Part IIf.C.
See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 136-37.
Id.
Smith, 508 U.S. at 232.

193. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 136-37.
194. See SINGER, supra note 25, at § 51:03.
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shared. 195 In pari materia may not be applicable to all portions of
analogous statutes, however.19 6 Ruckelshaus held that where statutes
differ in material terminology, and courts can give independent and
consistent effect to each, in pari materia no longer applies. 197 Though
§ 844(h)(2) and § 924(c) contain similarities, the "in relation to"
language is explicit in only the latter statute. 98 Ruckelshaus demands
that courts respect the difference in the statutes. 199
Whether or not the Stewart court was correct in finding that the
original § 924(c) contained an implicit relational element, Stewart did
not bind the Ressam court to hold that the current § 844(h)(2) also
contains this element. The Ressam court improperly dismissed the fact
that Congress explicitly amended § 924(c) to include an "in relation to"
element but did not similarly amend § 844(h). 20 0 Given that subsequent
amendments to § 844(h) reflected a general awareness of § 924(c), 20 1 it
seems unlikely that the omission of "in relation to" language from
§ 844(h) was accidental. General Electric Co. and generally accepted
canons of statutory construction provide that when a statute contains a
given provision, omission of that provision from related statutes is
presumed to be intentional.2 °2 Had the Ninth Circuit heard Ressam in
1985, when the two statutes were nearly identical, a sweeping use of in
pari materia might have been justified, overlooking for a moment the
practical differences between explosives and firearms. The current
statutes, however, show meaningful differences regarding the
appropriate scope of each. Under General Electric, it is reasonable to
infer that "in relation to" was left out of § 844(h) deliberately, and courts
should be cognizant of that likelihood.20 3 Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. clearly stated the presumption that where statutes use
different words, those differences are intentional, and in pari materia
does not apply.2 04 Indeed, the use of in parimateria where statutes differ
195. Overstreet v. N. Space Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1943).
196. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsato, 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984).
197. Id. at 1018.
198. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000) with id. § 924(c).
199. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1018.
200. See United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2007).
201. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S17,360-62, 17,367 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988).
202. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. S. Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 137-38 (5th Cir. 1967); see also 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 352 (2007); SINGER, supra note 25, at §51:2.
203. See Gen. Elec. Co., 383 F.2d at 137-38.
204. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,__ U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411-12 (2006).
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in terms and where legislatures are aware of both statutes at the time of
drafting is generally discouraged. 205 Especially in light of the precise
connotations that "in relation to" carries after Smith-the requirement
that the weapon facilitate the underlying offenSe2 6 -courts should
refrain from reading this element into § 844(h)(2).
C.

Caselaw Discussingthe RelationalElement in Section 924(c) Is
Not Applicable to the Explosives Context

Courts should not read § 844(h) to include "in relation to," because
Smith equates "in relation to" with "for the purpose of facilitating. 20 7
Explosives seldom facilitate felonies in the same way firearms do, and
reading "in relation to" into § 844(h) would preclude appropriate
prosecutions under the statute.20 8 Congress clearly intended § 844(h) to
prevent bombings, 20 9 and the statute must be read accordingly.
Smith held that the relational element in § 924(c) is satisfied when a
gun is used to facilitate the underlying felony or embolden the
defendant.2 10 This facilitation standard makes sense in relation to guns.
Criminals commonly carry guns to facilitate crime: nearly fifteen
percent of all federal prisoners carried a gun during the crime for which
they were currently incarcerated, and thirty-five percent of federal
inmates in prison for homicide, sexual assault, assault, robbery, or other
violent crime admitted to carrying a gun when committing the crime. 1
Of those federal inmates who carried a gun during their current offense,
more than one-half actively brandished or discharged the firearm.21 2
By adding the "in relation to" language to § 924(c), Congress
attempted to retain the strength of the law as it related to gun crime
while allaying fears that a person could be prosecuted for possessing a

205. See, e.g., United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (noting that different language in different statutes should convey different meanings
when the two statutes have linked legislative histories).
206. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993).
207. Id.
208. See infra notes 216-221 and accompanying text.
209. United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1983); H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 37
(1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4013.
210. Smith, 508 U.S. at 238.
211. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BY OFFENDERS 1 (2001).
212. Id.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: FIREARM USE
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firearm during the commission of a crime.2 13 The Ninth Circuit in
Stewart produced the facilitation standard to reflect this intent, a
standard later endorsed in Smith.214 In so holding, Stewart implied that
§ 924(c) does not criminalize gun possession if such possession does not
facilitate an underlying offense.21 5
Unlike firearms, explosives are not commonly carried, and their use
for intimidation or protection during the commission of other crimes
appears to be relatively rare.2 16 A 1996 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms Selected Explosives Incidents Report noted that the vast
majority of explosives incidents are related to vandalism and revenge,
and fewer than two percent of incidents were motivated by a desire to
commit a homicide, suicide, or robbery. 17 Common sense and
experience suggest that Ivy, in which the defendant carried a bomb to aid
in kidnapping,218 is a rare case.
The facilitation standard is impractical in the explosives context
primarily because it fails to adequately punish those who carry
explosives with obvious, yet unrealized, plans of harming people and
property. Carrying explosives often involves the commission of other
felonies, even if it does not "facilitate" them. 21 9 Bombing, unlike
shooting, is usually not an incidental act. It is usually the culmination of
a series of unlawful acts, each of which contributes to the execution of a
bomb plot.220 Ressam demonstrates that the relationship between bomb

213. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 137 (1998) (citing United States v. Stewart, 779
F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985) and S. REP. No. 98-225, at 314 n.10 (1983), as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492).
214. Smith, 508 U.S. at 238; Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540.
215. Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540.
216. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: WEAPON USE

AND VIOLENT CRIME 2 (2003) (noting of all violent crimes committed with weapons, approximately
thirty-eight percent were committed with a firearm, twenty-five percent with a sharp object, sixteen
percent with a blunt object, and eighteen percent with an unspecified weapon, an unknown portion
of which may be explosives).
217. 1996
ATF
Selected
Explosives
Incidents
http://www.atf.gov/pub/fire-explo-pub/eir/motive.htm.

Report

(Mar.

19,

1999),

218. United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1991).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Nettles, 476 F.3d 508, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that bomb

plot included counterfeit activity to purchase bomb-making materials); United States v. Salameh,
261 F.3d 271, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2001) (listing the counts on which defendants were convicted for
their role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, including interstate transport of the bomb,

traveling in foreign commerce with intent to commit a crime of violence, making false statements to
the INS, and conspiracy charges related to the bombing).
220. See Nettles, 476 F.3d at 512; Salameh, 261 F.3d at 274-75.
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possession and its associated felonies is often difficult to predict, and the
relationship is seldom analogous to that of gun possession and its
associated felonies. 22' The explosives Ressam had stored in the trunk of
his car did, in fact, bear some relationship to the false information he
provided on his customs form, and Ressam lied precisely because the
explosives were there.222 Moreover, Ressam's carrying of the explosives
was not an innocent act, and it cannot reasonably be said that Congress
intended to excuse such acts because their relationship to an underlying
charge does not conform to the facilitation standard.223 The
dangerousness of the bomb was not diminished because "facilitation"
was lacking. A statute must not be read to restrict sentencing for
criminal activity that Congress clearly intended to punish.2 24 The
purpose of § 844(h) is to prevent bombings,22 5 and such a purpose
requires application of § 844(h) beyond instances in which the
explosives were found to facilitate the underlying offense.
D.

The Term "Carry" in Section 844(h) (2) Should Not Be Read So
Broadly that It Produces Absurd Results

The definition of the term "carry" in § 844(h) is unclear. Muscarello
failed to draw a bright line between the terms "carry" and "possess" and
instead relied on the explicit relational element in § 924(c) to serve as
the dividing line between the two terms.22 6 The fact that § 844(h) lacks
such an element has prompted fears that if similar language is not read
into § 844(h), prosecutions under the statute may run rampant.227
Defense briefs in Ressam cite examples, including prosecution of the
unwitting farmer who carries dynamite to his farm to blow up tree
stumps and commits an unrelated environmental felony during his
trip. 228 Another example cited in the defense briefs is the police officer
prosecuted for carrying gunpowder in his licensed, loaded handgun

221.
222.
223.
224.

See United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id.
See supra Part I1.B.
See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1948).

225. See supra Part 1iB.
226. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 137 (1998).
227. See Brief for the Defendant, United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 0530422), at 34.
228. Id.
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while taking an unrelated bribe. 229 These concerns are reminiscent of the
recognition by the Smith court that the "in relation to" limitation in
§ 924(c) served to prevent prosecutions where the defendant used the
firearm to scratch his head.23 °
The term "carry" should be limited so it does not encompass totally
unrelated, non-malicious possession that Congress did not intend to
criminalize. 231 The Ressam court, apparently recognizing this need,
incorporated the "in relation to" language from § 924(c) to define the
term "carry. 232 The Ivy court similarly attempted to confine the term by
holding that a defendant could be found to "carry" a bomb if it
facilitated his crime.23 3 By contrast, Jenkins and Rosenberg chose not to
draw discernible boundaries around the term "carry," allowing it to
become indistinguishable from mere possession.3
Whether the circuits' approaches reflect Congress's general intent in
drafting § 844(h)-the prevention of bombings-is unclear. 235 The
facilitation standard imposed by Ressam and Ivy is too rigid to prosecute
many cases in which a defendant carries explosives maliciously. The
rationale in Rosenberg fails to discuss any boundaries on the term
"carry" at all, thereby leaving open the possibility that mere possession
will be criminalized.2 36
The term "carry" in § 844(h)(2) should be limited only by the absurd
results doctrine. Courts retain the power to avoid plain language
application of penal statutes when doing so would produce absurd
results.2 37 This power is discretionary, and it does not provide defendants
with an up-front assurance that they will never be charged with a
violation of § 844(h)(2) when the underlying felony is totally
unrelated.23 8 Prosecutors and courts must be able to apply § 844(h)(2)
with some flexibility, however, and reliance on the absurd results

229. Id.
230. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 232 (1993).

231. See supra Part ll.B.
232. United States v.Ressam,474 F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir. 2007).
233. United States v.Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991).
234. United States v.Jenkins, 229 F.App'x 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.Rosenberg,
806 F.2d 1169 1177-79 (3d Cir. 1986).
235. See supra Part l.B.
236. See Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at1177-79.
237. See supra Part I.C.
238. Id.
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doctrine provides such flexibility. 239 It is not always obvious or
predictable how the possession of explosives will relate to felonious
behavior, or when application of the statute will be appropriate to deter
malicious possession.
Ultimately, we must rely on the sensibility of our judicial system, and
trust that courts will refrain from statutory constructions that result in
ten-year prison terms for people who blow up tree stumps with dynamite
or who scratch their heads with guns. Given the fact that the Supreme
Court has not interpreted the key terms of § 844(h)(2), and that the only
existing definition of "in relation to" is the facilitation standard, the
courts should not read "in relation to" into § 844(h)(2). Instead, courts
should use the absurd results doctrine to prevent applications of the
statute when the underlying felony is totally unrelated.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should refrain from reading a rigid relational element into
§ 844(h)(2). The Supreme Court has read the analogous firearm statute
broadly, and Congress has not amended § 844(h)(2) to include a
relational element, though it has had the opportunity to do so. Congress
is likely aware of the legal baggage associated with the words "in
relation to" in the context of the firearm statute-specifically, the
requirement that the weapon facilitate the underlying felony. By adding
the "in relation to" element to § 844(h)(2), courts unnecessarily restrict
the scope of the statute and leave unpunished those who commit felonies
in furtherance of a bombing plot. The absurd results doctrine, although
imperfect, is adequate to prevent the prosecution of defendants whose
possession of explosives is totally unrelated to the underlying felony.

239. Id.
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